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2004 6 10
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WORLD STREET JOURNAL/REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Leaving the DMZ
June 10, 2004
News that the U.S. plans to withdraw one third of its troops from South Korea has set alarm bells ringing in Seoul. But we wonder why the government is surprised. After 18 months of undermining the key reason for the American military presence in the eyes of ordinary South Koreans, President Roh Moo Hyun and his advisers are finally seeing their chickens come home to roost.
Perhaps this week's announcement that 12,500 of the 37,000 U.S. troops will leave by the end of next year finally will force President Roh to wake up to the dangers of spreading the myth that Pyongyang no longer poses a serious threat. If so, it will have achieved one immediate beneficial result.
American forces cannot be expected to remain as a "trip wire" in the frontline of the South's defenses when its leaders, and a growing number of its people, refuse even to take Pyongyang's threat, including its nuclear programs, seriously. Let alone recognize the risk of the bankrupt regime selling its plutonium to terrorist groups, who might then explode it in a major American city such as New York.
An ally's refusal to face up to the grave threat posed to U.S. national security by the North is not something the American public can be expected to tolerate for much longer. If this week's announcement has finally driven that message home in Seoul, so much the better.
On strictly military terms, there's long since ceased to be any need for American forces to be stationed along the Demilitarized Zone in order to repel an attack from the North -- or, for that matter, on the Korean peninsula at all. In an era of smart missiles and long-range bombers, the U.S. can do the job just as effectively from Guam, or from an aircraft carrier in the Sea of Japan.
As U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless said, "We have been for a long time, in effect, where we were when the Cold War ended. And it's time to adjust those locations from static defense through a more agile and a more capable and a more 21st century posture."
That doesn't mean bringing all the troops home. The proposed partial withdrawal serves several useful purposes. It not only sends a warning to President Roh but also frees up forces that could be better deployed in Iraq. Indeed, that's where the Second Brigade of the Second Infantry Division will be going, in the first phase of the pullout later this year.
A full withdrawal would send a very different message about U.S. engagement in the region. America's military presence in Asia has served the region well over the last half century, stemming the advance of Communism and serving as a guarantor of peace and stability that paved the way for a period of unprecedented economic growth. It has also served the U.S. well, creating a climate in which international commerce could flourish and the region could become America's second-largest trading partner, accounting for one third of U.S. exports.
Perhaps the greatest mark of success was that the export-orientated economic model that flourished under the American security umbrella in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan has worked so well that the region's remaining Communist regimes, from China to Vietnam, have embraced it in order to remain in power.
A U.S. presence in Korea was a vital component of that umbrella during the Cold War. And it remains so during the new era, when the key threats to American interests have shifted to terrorism and nuclear proliferation, not to mention deterring the emergence of a more aggressive form of Chinese militarism. That is less likely to manifest itself so long as the U.S. maintains an active military presence in the region.
Take away all American forces from Korea, and Japan would be left in the exposed position of being the only remaining U.S. military outpost in Asia. That could set a dangerous precedent for bringing the troops home from there as well. It might also undercut the efforts of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to push Japan to play a more active role in the alliance by rewriting the country's pacifist constitution.
And a U.S. pullout from Japan would leave Guam, far east of Asia's coast, as America's only forward deployment in the Western Pacific. More advanced weaponry might make it feasible to fight a war from there. But the plausible concern is that such a withdrawal would send a signal about U.S. involvement in the region that would make it difficult to maintain the security umbrella that has well served both America and Asia.
Hence the need to keep some forces in Korea, even if the provocations of President Roh's leftist allies aimed at precipitating a total withdrawal sometimes make it tempting to leave them to stew in their own juice. That need would remain even after the collapse of Kim Jong Il's regime, as even Kim Dae Jung, President Roh's equally appeasement-minded predecessor, publicly recognized.
But the size of that military presence is not set in stone. Nor need it be primarily dictated by South Korea's security concerns, especially when they fail to take America's into account. That's the message from this week's pullout announcement and one which the Roh administration ignores at its peril.
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