1 20 е 緡 5.18 ̻ ȸ ϸ '5.18 ѱ ' ߴ. ̶ ȸ ߴ 緡 ѱ ٰ ŷ ̱ CIA ̾.
а е 緡 ٰŷ "ѱ 518ȭ ʾҴٴ ̱ ߾(CIA) ǿ Ȯεƴ" ߴ. ̾. е ߰ų ְ ̾.
NSC(ȸ) ϴ 3 , ̴ܶ. 5.18 ܶ ù° ٿ ִ 常 Ͽ ѱ ٰ ߴ. ù ̷. ȭ ġ Ȳ Ͽ ӵ ʰ ִ. ü 5.18 ݴ.
ü ܶ ؼϸ ̷ ̴. ǰȥ ̴. ǰȥ ܱ ٹ Ȱ Ȱ ϰ ִ ̴.
ȭ ġ Ȳ Ͽ ӵ ʰ ִ. 1979 10.26 12.12´ ߴ. װ Ȳ ƴϴ. 츮 1979 12 20 SNIE 42/14.2-79 1980 2 8 ߵ, ѿ ϰ Ȳ Ͽ ѹݵ ϵ ߱ ִ. ƽþƿ ̽ ó ̰, ̱ Ȳ ɷ° ɷ ߴϰ ȭǾٰ ǴѴٸ ̴.
ܶ ؼ , ѱ ٴ ƴ϶, ݴ ȥ Ȳ ߵǸ ѱ ɼ ٴ ̴. 5.18 ܶ ̾Ƴ ü ݴ Ǵ ģ ̴. ϳ ü ȣϴ ̾.
뿡 1979 12 20ڡSNIE 42/14.2-79 ̹ ѱ ɼ ߾ٰ ִ. SNIE 42/14.2-79 1979 CIA ۼ , Ȳ ѱ ̾. Ϻ ־, ꡯ þҴ. ̱ ü ̴.
8. Thus we believe that North Korean military intervention would likely take the form of a large-scale, coordinated ground, naval, and air assault against the South. Large numbers of ranger-commando troops would be inserted both innediately behind the South's frontlines and deep into the interior to support frontal attacks by conventional ground forces across the Demilitarized Zone.
The North's Air Force would attempt to neutralize the South Korean and US close-air-support capability by attacking airfields and command and control and air defense sites. The North Korean Navy would support assaults on key coastal targets and conduct antishipping operations off the South's coasts.
ѱ ѿ ൿ() Ը ذ ¸ ϴ´. Ը Ư(Ưδ) ģ ϱ ﰢ ĸ( ٷ Ĺ) Ĺ η ÿ Ե ̴.
, ּ, ü ִ μ ѱ ̱ ɷ ȭ Ϸ ̴. ر ֿ ؾ ǥ ̰, ؾ () ̴.
Ÿ CIA й ̷ ̴.
ȭ ġ Ȳ ѱ , 79 2 80 2 ̹ ߵ, Ȳ ѱ ߱ ְ, ̱ ٸ ó ̰ų, ̷ Ȳ ̱ ɷ ȭǾٰ Ǵϸ ̴.( ű ̴)
ѱ ٴ ƴ϶ ϰ ѱ ġ ɼ ִ ̴. ѱ ϴ ƴ϶, 5.18 Ǽ ְ ִ . ƿ ٸ ϰ ֱ, 5.18 ħ ִ μ ġ .
5.18 ƿ ߴ. ̷ 5.18 ϻ̴. ̷ ü ο ȯؾ ϴ. 5.18 Ҿ а е鵵 ̱ . ̷ β ͵ ȭ ̶, õ̴.
ֽ ǰȥ Բ 縦 帰.
ݿ ٿ ִ.
ٶ ߿