Confession from the employee of the National Intelligence Bureau of Korea on the Presidential Election Plot
I have experience of 17 years working in national intelligence bureau.
Watching the opponent partys presidential candidates retirement announcement with tear, I confess today that I, including my colleagues, committed wrong-doings in this presidential election, which I should have not done.
. We started the project 6 months ago from the request of the Blue House and other department asking us to prevent the opponents victory at all cost.
We were preparing the implementation of the integral programs to prevent opponents victory from various angles after establishing strategies and implementation guidelines since the opponents victory was expected at that time.
As a test, we manipulated poll on Noh and Jung such that Noh can be a unified candidate as a ruling partys candidate. It was secret activity and successful.
The reason behind the success with minimization of peoples doubt was due to countless iteration of verification using probability uncertainty range given the poll method and it worked.
Total of 19 core members were involved in this project and the cost was about 5 million US dollars (activity cost, bribes, and other costs included)
Our manipulation technique, which made unification of candidate successful, was applied to this presidential election by the national intelligence bureau.
The key in manipulation was the responsible company and the engineers changing numbers since digital vote counting was introduced in this election.
Two methods were used. One: if there is 10~12 consecutive outcomes of candidate 1, then one is automatically allocated to candidate 2. Two: Regionally, 2000-25000 votes were manipulated automatically, and transmitted to the central computer. Also intervention was made possible between local and central collection center with automatic device.
Detailed technical methods were allocated to the technical engineers and this was applied in the presidential election.
Exit poll at the election sites of 3 major broadcasting stations (SBS, KBS, MBC) was manipulated such that the numbers match well with the target numbers which was supposed to be programmed, using the drawback of sample poll survey, although ruling partys candidate were unfavorable.
The estimated cost was stunning 13 million US dollars. The detailed story is too large to explain. This was conducted at the sake of the Blue House and the national intelligence bureau. However, I regret doing this as one of citizen and want to reveal only regions of massive manipulation.
Regions of 10,000~25,000 vote manipulation: SungDongGu, GoungJinGu, DongDaeMunGu, SungBukGu, NoWonGu, YangChunGu, KangSeGu, GuroGu in Seoul
Regions of 5,000~6,000 vote manipulation: DongGu, JungGu, SeGu, YuSungGu, DaeDukGu in DaeJeon
Regions of 5,000~6,000 vote manipulation: ChungJu City in ChungBuk, SangDangGu, ChungJu city, JeChun City, ChungWonGun, YongDongGun, BoEunGun, JinChunGun, ChunAn City in ChungNam, GongJu city, BoReung City, Asan City, NonSan City, HingSungGun, SeSan City, DangJinGun
JunRaDo manipulated about 470,000 votes
I am ready to go through any punishments due to this conduct and deeply apologize once again to Hannara (opposition party) and the people of Korea.
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