湮ڼ
370,207,892
Ȩ ȸ Խ ߿ Ұ ãƿô
湮ڼ
8,440

湮ڼ
8,035

             
  
߿TV
   
     
å
            
  
  
  
   ȸ
  
  
  
   ȣ
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
ı
 
 
ۼ : ߡ    ۼ : 03-03-05 ȸ : 9,656 õ : 9 ȣ :393
1 лƮ..鵵 а. ߿
ݹ 鸸 ũ ΰŰ..
кҽ ü ° ִ ..
лƮ ƿ Ϻ ũ ְ..
, Ʒ ʼ, ýŬ ۿԽϴ,
Ʒ ؼ ´ 𸣰,
ְ ؼ 縦 ۼߴٸ, ϱ,
̵ ̵ ΰ аŸ ϴ,




ۿ±̴. 츮 Ⱥ 踦 ̱ ̷ ְ ذ鼭 츮 ̰ ϴ ϴ ڵ ǰ ǽɽ.





þ ̶ ڰ <ù 450 ׾ رŰڴ> 縦 , ϴ.

뼱 Ǹ, Ѵٴ ̵ е ̿ ٴ ڿƴ Դϴ. , ִ 漱 ı 빫 ߽ϴ. ... ¥ 𸣰ڳ׿.

츮.. ̷ ¥ ó ϴ° ƴұ?

 õ ó Ʈ ڴ ϸ, μ ð Ǹ ֽϱ?

̷ ƹ ǵ ֽϱ? Ƽ ϸ ĥ ɴ аŸ ϱ?

켱 ̱ γ 츮 ƴϰ, ̱ ϰ Ʈ Ұ ۷ι ťƼ(www.globalsecurity.org) ҽ ΰ ִٴ° Դϴ. ٸ Ź鵵 ̰ οؼ ϱ. ¥ ̶ ڰ ְؼ ڱ 縦 Դϴ.

縦 ѹ ¤ . ǹؿ ֽϴ.


1. "ù 450 ׾ رŰڴ" ̾ҽϴ. ̱ ̶ũ Ϸ ó, ̱ ؼ رŰ Ѵٴ Դϴ. ȹ OPLAN 5027 ׷ ?

OPLAN 5027 < ħ ¡ĸ 쿡> ִٴ ֽϴ. е ϴ ּ ũ , ڴ ƴմϴ. ޸ OPLAN 5027 ѱ ົ ޵Ǿ ִ ܼ, ʰ ֽϴ. ̰ µ, "ù 450 ׾ رŰڴ" ǵ ̴ϴ.

Դٰ 450 ϴ ͵ ۷ι ťƼ ӽ ְ ְ ҽϴ. ̸׸ OPLAN 5027-98 ֽϴ.

[ £ ȭ ݿ ¼ ߿õǰ ִ. ѱ Ű ̻ ̸ 1200 ù ִ 38 ۼƮ װ ̶ ϰ ִٰ Ѵ.]

ٷ ̷ Ÿ ̻ϵ ɷ ùε 450̳ ϱ , ؼ 뷮 ؾ Ѵٴ Դϴ.

ħ Ϸ ϴµ, ³׵ а , ҹٴٿ ȭ ƺȯ ճ ٸ Դϱ?

츮 Ʈ ô. 츮 ̿ ѹ ߰, Ͱ ȭ ξ, 籹ڰ Ű Բ 뺧 ȭ ڷ 㹫ϰ и߽ϴ. .. ׷ ϱ, Ҿ. 뺧 ȭ ޾?

ƹ ʿ ִ 츮 ҿ ̿, ׵ ѹ ȭ ߿ ϴ.


2. OPLAN 5027 Ⱑ 98 ħ ϴ, ϱ ϰ ġ ɷ Ǿ ִٴ ̴ϴ. ߱ þƸ ѰŰ, 츮 忡 Ⱑ ʽϱ? ùθ 45ʸ ״´ٴµ, ׷ 鸸 װ , ϱ Ѿ ϰ ȴٴϿ. ׷ ׾, ϵ Ѵٴ ̴ϱ?

ѹݵ ٲ ݿ Ǿ, 98ʹ OPLAN 5027 ٲ, ħ , Ͽ ֵ ǰԲ Ǿϴ.

̰ 翬 ׷ ٲ Ǵ ε, ̰ ر׿. ĵ , ׳ ̶ 縮 ´ , ׷ ?

̸׸ ̷ϴ.

[ ̾ 1998 Ȯ OPLAN 5027-98 鿡 ̷. ݱ OPLAN 5027 鿡 (ѹݵ ) ϰ ʸӷ 𰢽Ű Ǿ ־. ]

Ⱑ ? ... ̽¸ , ž. Ƹ ̴̸ ֱ̰ 忡 а ö󰡶 ߰.


3. ߿ Դϴ.

[ ۷ιťƼ "ν ο Ʈ ż 2002 ȹ ѱ ʰ ̱ Ѱ ġ ִٴ 뵵 ߰ߵƴ" ִ.]

ѹ ۷ι ťƼ κ ? OPLAN 5027-02 ׸Դϴ.

[ 2002 ߹ݿ ε ° 뷮 鿡 ݿ 긮 . ν ο Ʈ μ ̷ ̽ ͵ ѹݵ ִ ̱ ͱ Ѱ ̷ ż ׸ ־. 긮ο , ݸ ɰ 丶 İ ȹ ̻ Ǹ Ҵ.]

ε üϿ Բ ν ĵε, ° 긮 ٴ° Դϴ. ׳ װ͵ ݸ ݴؼ, ̻ Ǵ ٴ Դϴ.

ڿ ۷ι ťƼ ÷ Ҵ, õ κ ϴ.

[ 2002 ̱ 뷮 ⿡ 긮ߴ.

ν ο Ʈ ż 2002 ȹ ѱ ʰ ̱ Ѱ ġ ִٴ 뵵 ߰ߵƴ.]

° 긮 Ͱ 尡 긮 ԰ õԴϴ. ϴ 긮 ó ѹ մϴ. ׸ " ν ο Ʈ ż 2002 ȹ ѱ ʰ ̱ Ѱ ġ ִٴ 뵵 ߰ߵƴ" ڱ ־, 긮ε ִ ſ Ұ ѱ ġ ̱ ó ѹ . ݸ ȿ ݴؼ ̻ ǰ ٴ α׸ մϴ.

ؿ ÷ , ̶ð ޾ ʽÿ. ڷ Ͽ ݹ ҷ Ű ؼ, Ʈ ְ ġ ʰ ֽϴ.


4. 翡

[ ̱ 2004 ȹ ѱ MD(̻Ϲ) 䱸ϰ ִ Ȯε, 4 ü Ѱ 빫 ̶ ̱ MD й ż ϰ ִ.]

Ҵ, ߳ ۷ι ťƼ 2004 ȹ κ ϴ.

[ OPLAN 5027-04

ƮƮ ̻ ̱ ġ ̻ ý, δ ̻ ý 2004⵵ ߾ ɷ ϰ ִ. װ͵ ׽Ʈ ϳ ˷ī ġ ý; ػ ý ر ô̳ ô; ׸ ⿡ ž ý ǰ̴. 2004 ̳ 2005 ʱ ˷ī Ʈ ׸ ̻ ݿ , ̴. װ ټ ̻ ý ġ ̴. ]

2004 ȹ  ؼ ѱ MD 䱸ϰ ִ°ɷ θ Դϴ. ڽ ٿ MD Ѵٴ ϴ. ϴ.

[2004()

2004 ȹ ̱ MDȹ(̻Ϲ ) Եƴ. 2004 ȹ ̱ ̻ ݿ 3 ̻ ûϰ ִ.

̱ 3 ̻ ٶī ݹ̻ ġ, Ѵ Ǵ δ ԰ . ]



ϴ ۷ι ťƼ Ʈ ִ Ϻθ Դϴ. ÷, о ñ ٶϴ.

ƴ Դϴ. ϱ ȣؼ, ⸦ ִ, ݿ µ鿡 ȭؼ ȵ˴ϴ.

̱ öϴ α ɼ Ůϴ. ̱ ̵ ִٰ ϰ ־µ, ư° ħ ȸ ǹԴϴ. ¥ ια , ƴٴ ̰ Ҹ ̸ Ĵ ֽϴ.

츮 ȸ ο ǿ ϰ ִ µ ū , ݿ <þ> 鼭 ϴ.

츮 ô.. .



[ ]

OPLAN 5027-96

1994 ѹݵ , OPLAN 5027 Ǿ, ̱ ̿ Ͼ Ϻ ְ ϴ ο Եǰ Ǿ. Ϻ ȸ 1999 5 24 Ϲ ̵ ̱ Ϻ ġؼ ѹݵ £ ְ ϰ ִ.


OPLAN 5027-98

̾ 1998 Ȯ OPLAN 5027-98 鿡 ̷. ݱ OPLAN 5027 鿡 (ѹݵ ) ϰ ʸӷ 𰢽Ű Ǿ ־. OPLAN 5027-98 Ȯϰ ߾ ִ. ̱ ϸ, " ȹ Ǹ, ü ̴. (׵ ׷ ٸ) 츮 ׳ ̱ ̴." ٲ ȹ " μ ϰ, ġ , ѹݵ Ͽ δ ̴. "

£ ȭ ݿ ¼ ߿õǰ ִ. ѱ Ű ̻ ̸ 1200 ù ִ 38 ۼƮ װ ̶ ϰ ִٰ Ѵ.

ο ȹ ια θ "м" ִ. 4 ܰ ̴: ħ Ȱ, ѱ , ݰ غ, ̴.

鿡 ϸ, ο ȹ ħ ȹϰ ִٴ Ȯ Ű ø Լ , Ÿ ѱ 鿡 ϰ ִ. ̱ ְ ο ȹ ԽŲ ̴. ħ غѴٴ Ȯ ŵ ְ, ̱ ݴϱ ٸ ʱ 츦 Ͽ, ̱ ѳ ǥ Ұ, ġ ִ.

ȹ ܼ ѱ ʸӷ 𰢽Ű ° ƴ϶, ϴ äϰ ִ. ȹ ̱ ѱ θ мϴ Ѵ. ȹ ϴ Ѵ. ̱ , ü ְ, ü Խų ̴.


OPLAN 5027-00

2000 12 4 鼭 ϸ, ѹݵ Ͼ ̱ 69 븦 ѹݵ ĺϱ Ǿ ִ. ̱ ѹݵ Ͼ µ ÷ Դ. 69 90 48 90 ߹ 63 Ŀ ̴. ѹݵ ĺ 69, 160ô, 1600, ĺ 信 90 ̳ Ϸ ̴.

δ ߵ̳ ƽþƿ ΰ ÿ ϱ⸦ ǥϴ ̱ ο - ̷ ĺ ϰ ־ٰ ϰ ִ. ̱ ȹ 뷮 ⿡ ó ִ Բ ʱ⿡ Ÿ ִ ġ ־ ΰ ִ.


OPLAN 5027-02


911 ׷ ķ ̱ 2002 2 OPLAN 5027 ɷ ˷. ִ ܵ ϰ ִ.

2002 ߹ݿ ε ° 뷮 鿡 ݿ 긮 . ν ο Ʈ μ ̷ ̽ ͵ ѹݵ ִ ̱ ͱ Ѱ ̷ ż ׸ ־. 긮ο , ݸ ɰ 丶 İ ȹ ̻ Ǹ Ҵ.


OPLAN 5027-04

ƮƮ ̻ ̱ ġ ̻ ý, δ ̻ ý 2004⵵ ߾ ɷ ϰ ִ. װ͵ ׽Ʈ ϳ ˷ī ġ ý; ػ ý ر ô̳ ô; ׸ ⿡ ž ý ǰ̴. 2004 ̳ 2005 ʱ ˷ī Ʈ ׸ ̻ ݿ , ̴. װ ټ ̻ ý ġ ̴.


[ ]




[ ]


OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West

Phases of War
Phase 1 - DPRK Attack
Phase 2 - ROK Defense
Phase 3 - US Counter-Attack
References
CFC (KOREA) OPLAN 9518X-XX Protection of US National Security Interests and Support for the Republic of South Korea 29 December 1999
Planning for Major Theater Wars: Examining the Worst Case by Major Gregory A. Pickell, US Army Military Review - January-February 2000
HANGING IN THE BALANCE: NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES - Peter Hayes February 25, 1994
Military Options in Korea's End Game Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired) May 23, 1994
New Warplan Calls for Invasion of North Korea By Richard Halloran, November 14, 1998
The Likelihood and Implications of a North Korean Attack on the South Kyongmann Jeon
Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 313-25.
Michael O'Hanlon, 'Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks', International Security', vol. 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998)



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


OPLAN 5027 is the US-ROK Combined Forces Command basic warplan. Under Operations Plan 5027 (CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027), the United States plans to provide units to reinforce the Republic of Korea in the event of external armed attack. These units and their estimated arrival dates are listed in the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), Appendix 6, to Annex A to CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027. The TPFDL is updated biennially through U.S./ROK agreements. CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027 is distributed with a SECRET-U.S./ROK classification.

Pyongyang can credibly threaten the prompt destruction of Seoul with conventional arms alone. The North Korean military could also establish a shallow foothold across the DMZ. However, the DPRK's ability to sustain these offensive operations, or advance its forces further to the south, is questionable. South Korean and American air forces could quickly establish air supremacy and destroy North Korean ground forces. The ensuing buildup of US forces in Korea could reverse any remaining North Korean advances into the South, and unlease offensive operations into the North. North Korea does not require long-range missiles with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads to devastate Seoul or to make a land grab across the DMZ. Such weapons are needed to deter or defeat an American counteroffensive into North Korea.

North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of Seoul, double the levels of a the mid-1990s. Seoul is within range of the 170mm Koksan gun and two hundred 240mm multiple-rocket launchers. The proximity of these long-range systems to the Demilitarized Zone threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks. Most of the rest of North Korea's artillery pieces are old and have limited range. North Korea fields an artillery force of over 12,000 self-propelled and towed weapon systems. Without moving any artillery pieces, the North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds an hour against Combined Forces Command defenses for several hours.

North Korea's short-term blitzkrieg strategy envisions a successful surprise attack in the early phase of the war to occupy some or all of South Korea before the arrival of US reinforcements on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean ground forces, totaling some 1 million soldiers, are composed of some 170 divisions and brigades including infantry, artillery, tank, mechanized and special operation forces. Of the total, about 60 divisions and brigades are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. North Korea has deployed more than half of its key forces in forward bases near the border. Seventy percent of their active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this force is protected by underground facilities, including over four thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone. From their current locations these forces can attack with minimal preparations. This means a surprise attack on South Korea is possible at any time without a prior redeployment of its units.

The North Korean navy has also deployed 430 surface combatants and about 60 percent of some 90 submarine combat vessels near the front line in forward bases. With about 40 percent of its 790 fighter planes deployed near the front line, the North Korean air force could launch a surprise attack on any part of South Korea within a short period of time.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea possesses larger forces than Iraq, and they are already deployed along South Korea's border. A war could explode after a warning of only a few hours or days, not weeks. Unlike in the Persian Gulf, this attack would be prosecuted along a narrow peninsula on mountainous terrain. It would probably be accompanied by massed artillery fire, commando raids, and chemical weapons. Initially, the primary battlefield would be only about 125 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. The DPRK attack would be conducted against well-prepared ROK forces in fortified positions and against larger US forces than in the Persian Gulf. Most probably, the DPRK attack would aim at seizing nearby Seoul by advancing down the Kaesong-Munsan, Kumwa, and Chorwon corridors. If successful, North Korean forces might also try to conquer the entire peninsula before large US reinforcements arrive.

The South Barrier Fence is the Southern part of the DMZ. The South Koreans have a series of Defensive lines that cross the entire peninsula, but with the exception of the South Barrier Fence, they aren't connected completely across the peninsula. They are designed to withstand an attack and allow a minimum force to hold a line while reinforcement/counter attack forces are assembled and sent to destroy any penetrations.

The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of allied defenses either before South Korea can fully mobilize its national power or before significant reinforcement from the United States can arrive and be deployed. The primary objective of North Korea's military strategy is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean control within 30 days of beginning hostilities. A secondary objective is the defense of North Korea.

To accomplish these ambitious objectives, North Korea envisions fighting a two-front war. The first front, consisting of conventional forces, is tasked with breaking through defending forces along the DMZ, destroying defending CFC forces, and advancing rapidly down the entire peninsula. This operation will be coordinated closely with the opening of a second front consisting of SOF units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in CFC's rear.

The DPRK offensive against the ROK will consist of three phases. The objective of the first phase will be to breach the defenses along the DMZ and destroy the forward deployed forces. The objective of the second phase will be to isolate Seoul and consolidate gains. The objective of the third phase will be to pursue and destroy remaining forces and occupy the remainder of the peninsula.

Approximately forty percent of the South Korean population resides within 40 miles of Seoul. While the terrain north of Seoul is dominated by rice paddies offering limited off-road mobility, the terrain west of Seoul is a wide coastal plan with the main invasion routes to Seoul. North Korean forces attacking Seoul through the Chorwon or Munsan corridors would have to cross the Han or Imjin rivers (while these rivers freeze in the winter, the ice is not strong enough to support heavy armor). The narrow eastern coastal plain is lightly settled and less heavily defended, though mountains make movement of forces from the east coast difficult.

The US plans are based on the belief that the North Koreans would not be successful in consolidating their gains around Seoul and could be pushed back across the DMZ -- though the plans assume the North may break through the DMZ in places. A critical issue is strategic warning of unambiguous signs that North Korea is preparing an attack. The warning time has reportedly been shortened from about ten days to about three days as North Korea has covered its military activities.

The US-ROK defense plan would be shaped not only by the threat but also by the mountainous terrain. Korea is commonly regarded as rugged infantry terrain that invites neither mobile ground warfare nor heavy air bombardment, but North Korea has assembled large armored forces that are critical to exploiting breakthroughs, and these forces would pass down narrow corridors that are potential killing zones for U.S. airpower. A new Korean War would bear little resemblance to the conflict of 195053.

During Phase 1, US-ROK forces would conduct a vigorous forward defense aimed at protecting Seoul. Their campaign would be dominated by combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and armor. US air and naval forces would conduct close air support, interdiction, and deep strike missions. After Phase 1, US-ROK operations in Phase 2 would probably focus on seizing key terrain, inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces, and rebuffing further attacks. Phase 3, to start when the US ground buildup was complete and ROK forces were replenished, would be a powerful counteroffensive aimed at destroying the DPRK's military power. The war plan envisions amphibious assaults into North Korea by US Army and Marines at the narrow waist of North Korea. The entire resources of the US Marine Corps would flow there to establish a beachead, with substantial Army resources quickly conducting over-the-shore operations.

OPLAN 5027-94
As of 1994 it was reported that a variant OPLAN 5027 under consideration by CINCPAC focused on a scenario under which ROK forces were able to blunt a DPRK offensive and stabilize a defensive line at FEBA Bravo (20-30 miles below the DMZ). Subsequently, US-ROK Combined Forces Command would execute a retaliatory offensive once US reinforcements arrived. A major air campaign against northern forces would be required before the counteroffensive could begin. A US Marine Expeditionary Force (in division strength) and the 82nd Air Assault Division, along with ROK divisions, would launch an overland offensive north toward Wonsan from the east coas. Soon thereafter, a combined US-ROK force would stage an amphibious landing near Wonsan, and advance to Pyongyang. Subsequently, a combined US-ROK force would execute a major counteroffensive from north of Seoul aimed at seizing Pyongyang. This would be achieved either by linking up with the force at Wonsan, or meeting it at Pyongyang.

A favorable outcome for the South depends on two conditions. First, the ROK forces must withstand DPRK forces during the initial 5-15 days of North Koean offensive actions. Second, they must hold the line while US and ROK forces are mobilized for the counteroffensive, which could take another 15-20 days.

OPLAN 5027-96
After the nuclear crisis of 1994, OPLAN 5027 was completely overhauled, including a new agreement to ensure Japanese bases are available if the US goes to war with North Korea. The updated Japan-US defense cooperation guidelines, which the Japanese parliament approved 24 May 1999, allow the US to prepare for a Korean war by stationing its military forces in Japan and the Pacific region.

OPLAN 5027-98
Further revisions to the concept of operations were elaborated in OPLAN 5027-98, which was adopted in late 1998. Previous versions of OPLAN 5027 had called for stopping a North Korean invasion and pushing them back across the Demilitarized Zone. The new version of the plan was more clearly focused on offensive operations into North Korea. A senior US official was reported to have said: "When we're done, they will not be able to mount any military activity of any kind. We will kill them all." The goal of the revised plan was to "abolish North Korea as a functioning state, end the rule of its leader, Kim Jong Il, and reorganize the country under South Korean control."

New priorities also focused on countering sudden chemical and biological attacks against Seoul. The South Korean military reportedly estimates that 50 missiles carrying nerve gas could kill up to 38 percent of Seoul's 12 million inhabitants.

The new plan called for a campaign against North Korean armed forces and government involving "defeating them in detail." The operation would be conducted in four phases: activities prior to a North Korean attack, halting the initial North Korean assault, regrouping for a counter-attack, and finally a full scale invasion of North Korea to seize Pyongyang.

According to reports, the new military plan included preemptive attacks against North Korea's military bases, including long-range artillery and air forces bases, if intellitence detected a hard evidence that North Korea was preparing to wage war. US and South Korean military leaders included pre-emptive strikes in this revised war plan. If the North Koreans showed unmistakable signs of preparing to strike, and the US decided not to wait until South Korea had been attacked, US forces had targets in North Korea already picked out and weapons assigned to destroy them.

Tasks performed during the Destruction Phase of the OPLAN reportedly involve a strategy of maneuver warfare north of the Demilitarized Zone with a goal of terminating the North Korea regime, rather than simply terminating the war by returning North Korean forces to the Truce Line. In this phase operations would include the US invasion of North Korea, the destruction of the Korean Peoples Army and the North Korean government in Pyongyang. The plan includes the possibility of a Marine amphibious assault into the narrow waist of North Korea to cut the country in two. US troops would occupy north Korea and "Washington and Seoul will then abolish north Korea as a state and reorganize it under South Korean control.

When this new war plan leaked to the press in November 1998, it escalated tensions between the United States and North Korea. North Korea sharply criticized OPLAN 5027-98, charging that it was a war scenario for the invasion of North Korea. Pyongyang blamed Seoul for the revision of OPLAN 5027, and a North Korean Army spokesman stated 02 December 1998 that North Korea had the right to take a containment offensive while holding mass rallies of military units and various social organizations to criticize OPLAN 5027. Such incidents illustrated North Korea's sensitive reaction to the OPLAN 5027.

On 02 December 1998 the General Staff of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) issued a lengthy and authoritative statement warning that the United States was instigating a new war. The statement stressed that the KPA would rise to the challenge. "We neither want nor avoid a war. If a war is imposed, we will never miss the opportunity," the statement read. The unique aspect of Pyongyang's public statements is the preoccupation with "US war-plan # 5027" as an imminent threat. Official Pyongyang is adamant that "war-plan # 5027" is already being implemented, and public statements frequently focus on OPLAN 5027.

OPLAN 5027-00
According to the 04 December 2000 South Korean Defense Ministry White Paper, the United States would deploy up to 690,000 troops on the Korean peninsula if a new war breaks out. The United States apparently had considerably increased the number of troops that would be deployed in any new Korean conflict. The figure had risen from 480,000 in plans made in the early 1990s and 630,000 in the mid-1990s. The latest Time Phased Forces Deployment Data for any contingency on the Korean Peninsula is comprised of 690,000 troops, 160 Navy ships and 1,600 aircraft deployed from the U.S. within 90 days.

The South Korean defense ministry described the increase as the result of a new US "win-win strategy," which would require the United States to have the capability to fight two wars simultaneously, such as in the Middle East and East Asia. Along with equipment to counter weapons of mass destruction, the US plan focused on the deployment of aircraft carriers and advanced aircraft to attack enemy artillery units in the early stages of any war.

OPLAN 5027-02
In February 2002 it was reported that the US military was updating OPLAN 5027 in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This includes a military calculation of the force needed to remove North Korean leader Kim Jung Il.

In mid-2002 a top aide to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld briefed a concept of operations for striking North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. This case study in the application of the Bush administration's new doctrine of pre-emptive military action envisioned a swift attack, carried out without consulting South Korea, America's ally on the peninsula. Soone after word of the briefing spread, administration officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of US forces in the Pacific, worked to stifle further discussion of the scheme.

OPLAN 5027-04
While Patriot is the only missile defense system deployed by the US military, the Defense Department expects that three "emergency capabilities" for missile defense will begin to emerge in the year 2004. Those capabilities are ground-based midcourse interceptors being installed in Alaska as part of a Pacific test bed; sea-based midcourse interceptors on one or two Navy Aegis ships; and an Airborne Laser prototype. By late 2004 or early 2005 the missile-defense test site at Fort Greely, Alaska could provide an emergency capability against a North Korean missile attack, but it will be extremely limited. Five anti-missile interceptors will be deployed at the site.


[ ]


[ þ ]


"ù 450 ׾ رŰڴ"
<̱ ѹݵ ó> "̱ "
2003-03-04 11:47:53



̱ Ʈ ۷ιťƼ(www.globalsecurity.org) ѹݵ ߹߽ ѡ 籹 ȹ OPLAN 5027 , ū Ȱְ ִ.

۷ιťƼ OPLAN 5027 1 Ⱑ ߹ߴ 1994Ǻ 2004DZ ȭ ȹ Ұϰ ִ.

⼭ ̱ 98 ѿ ݰ ر '' ϴ ÿ, " Ÿ ĥ ִ ȭ ࿡ ΰ ִ. ѱ ο Ű氡 ư ִ 50 ̻ α 1õ2鸸 38%(456) ̻ ִ ߴ" ִٴ ̴.

ּ ù 456 װų ġ ̱ Ŭ ǽ ̹ ȹ ̴. ̱ 鼺 ִ ̴.

W. ν ϸ鼭 9.11׷ ߹ Ŀ 2002 ̴.

۷ιťƼ "ν ο Ʈ ż 2002 ȹ ѱ ʰ ̱ Ѱ ġ ִٴ 뵵 ߰ߵƴ" ִ.

缱 빫 " Դ "  ־ ȵǰ ̱ ȹ ó ü ؾ Ѵٰ ͵ "ѱ ʰ ̱ Ѱ ġ ִ" ̰ ó ׺ Ǯ̵ȴ. Ȯϱ '' Ȯ 䱸 ִ ̴.

̱ 2004 ȹ ѱ MD(̻Ϲ) 䱸ϰ ִ Ȯε, 4 ü Ѱ 빫 ̶ ̱ MD й ż ϰ ִ.

Ʈ ۷ι ťƼ Ѥ 籹 ȹ 'OPLAN5027' www.globalsecur ity. org

̱ ѹݵ 帧 ǻ ִ ۷ι ťƼ ñ⺰ OPLAN 5027 ֿ ̴.

94

OPLAN 5027 94 Ư¡ ѡ ձ ࿡ ã ִ. ⺻ ѱ ߿ 󸶳 ִİ ̴. ѱ Ϻ 뷫 5~15, ߰ ѡ ձ ⵿ ȿ ݰ 15~20 Ƴ OPLAN 5027 94 ִ.

ѱ 뿡 20~30 Ĺ ǹϴ ǹ (FEBA Bravo) ϰ ̱ ߰ ϸ ݰ Ѵ. ݱ⸦ ѡ ձ ݰ ۵DZ ϸ غ, 82 ѱ ܰ Բ 꿡 ϰ Ϻηκ Ѵ.

Ǵ 밡 Ǿ ִ ̴.




96

̱ Ѱ ׹ Ÿ Ⱑ ټ ؼҵǸ鼭 OPLAN 5027 96 . 96 ߿伺 ﵵ߽ Ϻ ̱ ʱ Ǿ Ѵٴ ִٴ ̴. ﵵ߿ Ϻ ̱ ʱȭ Ѵٴ ѡ ձ ѿ ݰݱ ð ִ ؾ Ѵٴ ǵ ִ ̴.

Ϻȸ 1999 524 Ϻ ̱ ֵϸ鼭 Ϻ ѹݵ ʱȭѴٴ ״.

98

ȹ ַ Ƴ  ġ , 98 ѿ Բ ɼ . ̱ 98 ȹ ǥ ȭ ü ĽŰ ̸ ְ ѹݵ ϴ ̴١ .

98ǿ Ÿ ĥ ִ ȭ ࿡ ΰ ִ. ѱ ο Ű氡 ư ִ 50 ̻ α 1õ2鸸 38%(456) ̻ ִ ߴ.

ϰ ٸ 98 ȹ ѱ ⵵ Ǹ ֿü Ѵٴ 뵵 Ѵ. 98 ȹ 94ǿ Դ ѡ ձ ºл ʷѴٴ ǵ ϰ ִ. 98 رŲٴ Ѱ ߴ.

1998 ο ȹ Ѱ ̱ 谡 ƴ. ο ȹ ħ ̶ ̱ ߰ ѱ 뺯 ̱ ħ ϱ û ʿ䰡 ִ١ ΰ .

2000

2000 12 4 ǥ ѱ鼭 ѹݵ ۵Ǹ ̱ 69 븦 ̴١ ִ. ѹݵ ߹߽ ̱ ̴ 1990 ʹ 48 90 ߹ 63 ؿԴ. 鼭 Ѱ ߹ϸ ̱ 90 69 , 160 , 1õ6 ⸦ ѹݵ ߰ġѴ١ .

- ǥ 2000 ȹ ȭ ߹ ̱ ѹݵ ʱ⿡ Ⱓü ߾. ̱ ߵ ѹݵ ÿ ġ ִٴ Ͽ ° ġ ִ.

2002

9.11׷ ݿ ۽ο ִ ̱ 2002 ȹ ְ Ͽ ϻ 꿡 ־. 2002 ̱ 뷮 ⿡ 긮ߴ.

ν ο Ʈ ż 2002 ȹ ѱ ʰ ̱ Ѱ ġ ִٴ 뵵 ߰ߵƴ.

2004()

2004 ȹ ̱ MDȹ(̻Ϲ ) Եƴ. 2004 ȹ ̱ ̻ ݿ 3 ̻ ûϰ ִ.

̱ 3 ̻ ٶī ݹ̻ ġ, Ѵ Ǵ δ ԰ .

/

455
õ : 9
Խñ twitter Խñ facebook Խñ Me2Day Խñ  Խñ ۷ ϸũ ϱ Խñ ̹ ϸũ ϱ
߹ùοȸ(߿)

Vanessabab 11-03-11 03:03
 
Tolle Artikel die auf jedenfall auch mir gefallen duerfte. Aber auch meine Website d
 
 
 

Total 266,919
Ŀ : 301-0064-5221-51 ( : ߹ùοȸ)
߿     ۼ       ۼ ȸ õ
339 δ  ٹ̴ ó϶ Ư˿ǡ 03-05 5026 5
338 ̱ ̶ũ رŰ... 03-05 5078 10
337 帳ϴ. ߸......... ڰ 03-05 5117 6
336 лƮ..鵵 а. (1) ߡ 03-05 9657 9
335 ݱ δȸ ؾ Ѵ!!! ׳ 03-05 5388 13
334 03-05 5512 10
333 ١١<ڰǥ ̿ ǥ ƶ.> ١١ ³ 03-05 5286 13
332 빫 ۿ ϶ Ѹ å ൿ ļ 03-05 4938 4
331 CIA  սô 03-05 5215 16
330 , ڲ ϸ鼭... ù 03-05 5029 4
329 [÷] ȭ ϼ䡱 .. 03-05 5464 4
328 ̱ ø ٽ մϴ ! ̱ ø 03-05 5199 21
327 2002 03-05 4968 9
326 ................ϴ粤 03-05 5193 20
325 ϴ Ѵ ± ں ̳ ڶ... 03-05 5059 7
324 ޹?... ... 03-05 5134 4
323 ڽ Ȱ ũ 03-05 5049 8
322 ǹ ȸ Ȥ Ѱܷ 03-05 5193 4
321 ̷, ڵ, 𿳱, ?? ȣ, 03-05 4896 6
320 ûʹ Խ dz 03-05 5604 5
   13321  13322  13323  13324  13325  13326  13327  13328  13329  13330    
) 06233 84 23 ѶŬ 1115ȣ TEL : 02-558-5544 FAX : 02-566-6266
[E-mail] [email protected]
߹ùοȸ / ȣ 220-82-60326 /
Ŀ : 301-0064-5221-51 ( : ߿ TV)
ͳ ּ : badkiller.kr
Korean Solidarity for Anti-Corruption Copyrights 2000 All Rights Reserved