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Seoul Control
The WallStreet Journal 2006. 8. 18 [LOOK & OUTLOOK]
Kim Jong Il may not advise Seoul¢¥s Blue House, but some days, it feels like he does. On Tuesday, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun called for Seoul to take command of Korean troops in wartime -- a move that would split command of current forces between Seoul and Washington and give the North Koreans a distinct edge in case of a conflict. Nevertheless, the Pentagon is taking Mr. Roh¢¥s proposal seriously.
For more than 50 years, the U.S., working with the South, has maintained a credible deterrent force in South Korea. Though U.S. troop levels have fallen in recent years due to other commitments, and a mutual interest in handing more responsibility to South Korean troops especially along the demilitarized zone, the Pentagon still stations nearly 30,000 GIs and advanced weaponry, including fighter jets, surface-to-air missiles, and other apparatus belli in the democratic South.
That¢¥s not good enough for Mr. Roh, who was elected on a strongly anti-American, populist platform back in 2002 -- the main tenet of which has been to appease the dictator to the North. "The time has come for South Korea to defend itself," Mr. Roh declared in an interview with South Korea¢¥s Yonhap news agency earlier this month. "We have the capability. There will be no problem with national security. South Korea¢¥s defense capabilities have been much underestimated."
Seoul does, indeed, have the capability to fight a war. And in principle, it would be better if Seoul ultimately took full control of the security of the peninsula. But the issue isn¢¥t whether Seoul can fight a war -- it¢¥s whether it would have the will to do so.
But if Mr. Roh and his predecessors¢¥ appeasement proclivities are any sign, that¢¥s a questionable proposition. Seoul¢¥s sunshine policy, enacted by then-President Kim Dae Jung in 1998, put engagement with the North -- with few conditions -- squarely at the forefront of the Blue House¢¥s agenda. The kinder, gentler approach has yielded, over the past eight years, two North Korea missile launches, the North¢¥s refusal to return Japanese abductees, and Pyongyang¢¥s development of at least one nuclear weapon. It¢¥s estimated that North Korea now has more than 800 missiles capable of hitting Japan and South Korea.
Mr. Roh¢¥s characterization of the current U.S. military cooperation is a mite misleading, too. True, a U.S. four-star general directs U.S. and some 650,000-strong South Korean troops in times of war. (Peace time command was transferred to Seoul in 1994.) Technically speaking, however, the U.S. doesn¢¥t command South Korean forces during wartime, but rather coordinates combat operations of a mutually developed war plan. South Korean generals also serve as deputy commanders in the Combined Forces Command in Seoul.
There¢¥s a good reason for this arrangement. Splitting command of the forces in wartime could create a strategic schism that North Korea could exploit.
Not everyone in Seoul thinks Mr. Roh¢¥s plan is a good idea. Sixteen former South Korean defense ministers rallied in protest of Mr. Roh¢¥s proposal to dismantle the Combined Forces Command last Friday, for fear it would erode the U.S. commitment to South Korea¢¥s security. That echoes the fears of many older Koreans, whose memory of the Korean War -- and U.S. liberation of the South -- makes them less likely to support a change of command.
Mr. Roh¢¥s split-command idea has been brewing for awhile. It was first proposed to the U.S. during annual defense talks between Washington and Seoul last October, we¢¥re told, and both parties agreed to develop a road map to transition. A senior American defense official offered to shorten the transition period from 2012 to 2009. Next month, when Mr. Roh visits Washington, there¢¥s little doubt that the issue will come up. And that comes in advance of an important annual huddle between the two countries¢¥ defense ministers in October.
Mr. Roh has had his share of disagreements with the Bush Administration -- on U.S. troop reductions, six-party talks, and the North¢¥s recent missile test. He¢¥s not willing to help the U.S. deter North Korea¢¥s nuclear threat to America, yet he wants the U.S. to defend South Korea. Talk about a mixed message.
South Korea will hold presidential elections next year and the role of U.S. forces is sure to be a campaign issue, including a debate on what South Korea would do in the event of war on the peninsula. As for the U.S., the same issues deserve to be raised there too. If Seoul doesn¢¥t have the will to defend itself, perhaps it¢¥s time to consider how much longer American troops should stay in South Korea.
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